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THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW: IS
THERE LIFE AFTER DEATH?
That in the state of nature everyone has the executive power
of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it
is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that
self-love will make men partial to themselves and their
friends... and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will
follow.'
Throughout the history of the United States, allegations of crim-
inal conduct have been directed against the highest levels of gov-
ernment.2 The prosecution of federal officials is the responsibility
1 John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Govern-
ment, in SocIAL CONTRAcT 3, 9 (Sir Ernest Barker ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1960) (1947).
2 See In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1987). During President Truman's adminis-
tration, the Assistant Commissioner of the Internal Revenue, the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice and more than 150 Bureau of Internal
Revenue officials resigned or were discharged because of widespread corruption. Id. Attor-
ney General J. Howard McGrath appointed Newbald Morris as Special Assistant to the
Attorney General to lead an investigation into the alleged corruption. Id. Attorney General
McGrath fired Morris, however, when Morris requested access to McGrath's files and
records. Id. at 41. President Truman then fired McGrath. Id. The Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral in charge of the Tax Division and Truman's Appointments Secretary were not prose-
cuted. Id. Under President Eisenhower, the White House Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams,
ultimately resigned after alleged misconduct. Id.; S. REP. No. 417, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3
(1992) (hereinafter 1992 REPORT]. The infamous "Watergate" scandal began in 1972 with
the burglary at the Watergate office building in Washington, D.C. Id.; S. REP. No. 123,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2150, 2151 [hereinafter
1987 REPORT]. President Nixon had "special prosecutor" Archibald Cox appointed to inves-
tigate the criminal allegations. Id. After Mr. Cox attempted to obtain tape recordings and
documents in the President's possession, the President ordered that Mr. Cox be fired. Id.
Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus
resigned rather than fire Mr. Cox. Id. Solicitor General Robert Bork issued the order. Id.
These departures from the Department of Justice were later described as the "Saturday
Night Massacre." Id.; 1992 REPORT, supra, at 2-3. Congressional hearings, appointment of a
second special prosecutor, impeachment proceedings, and President Nixon's resignation all
followed. Id.; Linda Charlton, From the 'Whiskey Ring" to "Teapot Dome" and on, N.Y.
TnMEs, May 1, 1973, at 32. Ulysses S. Grant was linked to unscrupulous gold speculations
of the robber barons during his first term. Id. In his second term, the "Whiskey Ring" and
Credit Mobilier affairs occurred. Id. While President Grant was not directly involved in the
fraud and bribery, his Vice President and Secretary of War were. Id. The Teapot Dome
scandal of President Warren Harding's Administration involved illegal leasing of govern-
ment-owned oil reserves by Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall. Id. Secretary Fall was
tried, convicted, fired, and sentenced to one year in prison. Id. Under Lyndon B. Johnson's
administration, a close associate of the President, Bobby Baker, was found guilty of lar-
ceny, fraud, and tax evasion, and the Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas resigned after
accepting suspect payments. Id.; David Wise, Why the President's Men Stumble, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 18, 1982, § 6, at 14. Although portrayed as a man of high character, it was
revealed that President John Adams had accepted lavish gifts from a textile manufacturer,
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of the executive branch.3 However, a conflict of interest arises
when a prosecutor, who is a member of the executive branch, in-
vestigates an official from the same branch.4 Such a conflict ex-
Bernard Goldfine, and intervened on his behalf when two Federal regulatory agencies were
after Goldfine for mislabeling his product. Id.; see also infra notes 94-95 and accompanying
text (describing President Ronald Reagan's administration's involvement in Iran-Contra
scandal); infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (President Bush's administration in-
vestigated for alleged involvement in "Iraqgate").
3 See Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "Governmental
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function." Id.; Heck-
ler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). The Court stated:
[A]n agency's refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the characteristics
of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict-a decision which
has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it
is the Executive who is charged by the Constitution to "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (noting that
U.S. Constitution entrusts to President, not Congress, responsibility to see laws are faith-
fully executed); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
935 (1965). The Court stated:
Although as a member of the bar, the attorney for the United States is an officer of the
court, he is nevertheless an executive official of the government, and it is as an officer
of the executive department that he exercises a discretion as to whether or not there
shall be a prosecution in a particular case.
Id. But cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691. The Morrison Court placed a limitation on the idea
that the functions of the independent counsel are executive in nature by stating "there is no
real dispute that the functions performed by the independent counsel are 'executive' in the
sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been undertaken by offi-
cials within the Executive Branch." Id. (emphasis added); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 96-
97 (1946) (allowing Price Administrator, instead of District Attorney or Department of Jus-
tice, to commence suits to enjoin violations of Emergency Price Control Act); In re Sealed
Case, 838 F.2d 476, 526 (D.C. Cir.) (Ginsburg, C.J., dissenting) (admitting that prosecution
is executive task but that it is not at "core" of executive branch's functions to extent that it
must always be under President's control), rev'd, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); I.C.C. v. Chatsworth
Mktg. Ass'n, 347 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir.) (stating that function of initiating judicial pro-
ceeding in order to enforce legislative enactment is not exercise of function exclusively re-
served to President), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965), and cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1000(1966); United States v. Roy, 694 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D. Minn. 1988) (allowing congressional
delegation of authority to sentencing commission to establish sentencing guidelines be-
cause rule making is not necessarily exclusive function of executive branch). See generally
Stephanie A. Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson
and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1070 (1990) (arguing that intent of framers of
Constitution and history of prosecution support Morrison court's limitation on idea that
prosecution is "core" executive function).
4 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. "Congress of course was concerned when it created the
office of independent counsel with the conflicts of interest that could arise in situations
when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers." Id.;
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). "For it is quite evident that
one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's will." Id.; WATERGATE SPECIAL
PROSECUTION FORCE FINAL REPORT 137-38 (1977). "No one who has watched 'Watergate'
unfold can doubt that the Justice Department has difficulty investigating and prosecuting
high officials, or that an independent prosecutor is freer to act according to politically neu-
tral principals of fairness and justice." Id.; Independent Counsel Provisions of the Ethics in
Government Act, August 11, 1992: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Govern-
ment of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [here-
inafter Hearings] (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irvin B. Nathan on behalf of the American
1993] THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL LAW 563
isted during the 'Watergate" scandal of President Richard Nixon's
administration.' Watergate involved the burglary of the Demo-
cratic national headquarters in Washington, D.C., as well as espi-
onage and sabotage in which officials in the Nixon administration
were allegedly involved.6 President Nixon ordered Attorney Gen-
eral Elliot Richardson to appoint Archibald Cox as the special
prosecutor7 to investigate the alleged misconduct of high-level of-
ficers of the executive branch, including former Attorney General
John Mitchell and White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman.'
However, when Mr. Cox requested tape recordings and documents
Bar Association). Archibald Cox, the independent counsel appointed to investigate Water-
gate, once stated that an individual outside the executive branch was absolutely necessary.
Id. Otherwise, the divided loyalties would be too much for anyone to handle, and the public
would not feel comfortable with the investigation. Id.; S. REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4219 [hereinafter 1978 REPORT]. A study re-
garding the history of Congress, completed with the assistance of the Congressional Re-
search Service, identified a number of instances over the last twenty years where, because
of a serious conflict on the part of the Attorney General or the President, an investigation
handled outside the Justice Department would have been appropriate. Id. The Attorney
General and his principal assistants are appointees of the President and members of an
elected administration. Id. It is a conflict of interest for them to investigate their own cam-
paign or, thereafter, any allegations of criminal wrongdoing by high-level officials of the
executive branch. Id. The appearance of conflict is as dangerous to public confidence in the
administration ofjustice as the true conflict itself. Id. Having men of integrity in the face of
a conflict is an insufficient protection for a system of justice. Id. at 4222. But see 1992
REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. "The authority of the [Justice] Department effectively to re-
spond to allegations of wrongdoing by [Justice Department employees, members of Con-
gress, and judges].., proves that it can respond to such allegations brought against other
high-level officials.'" Id. (quoting Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger); Frank M.
Tuerkheimer, The Executive Investigates Itself, 65 CAL. L. REV. 597, 620 (1977). Any weak-
ness the Department of Justice may have in investigating the executive branch is due not
to the Department's structure, but to its staffing. Id.; Julia C. Ross, Endangered Species
Independent Counsel Law Appears Doomed to Expire Dec. 15, 78 A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at
109. Former Deputy Attorney General George Terwilliger III and Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Timothy E. Flanigan testified during the congressional hearings that the Justice De-
partment was more than capable of handling such prosecutions on its own. Id.; Bruce Fein,
Get Rid of Prosecutors, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 1992, at 14. With respect to the Justice De-
partment investigation into billion dollar loans to Iraq before the Kuwaiti invasion, the
investigators involved had no reason to compromise the investigations Id. The idea that the
executive branch cannot be trusted to investigate itself is historically inaccurate." Id.;
Hearings, supra at 7-8 (testimony of Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause). Crit-
ics of the independent counsel law have argued that the appointment of a new prosecutor
with protections against interference by the executive branch following the firing of Water-
gate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox demonstrated that "the system" worked. Id. Investi-
gations and prosecutions of the executive branch can be carried out successfully without a
separate independent counsel law. Id.
5 See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INc., WATERGATE: CHRONOLOGY OF A CRISIS(William B. Dickinson ed., 1974) (providing detailed account of Watergate scandal).
6 Id. at 3-12.
7 See infra note 49 and accompanying text (explaining term "special prosecutor" was
eventually replaced with "independent counsel" in relevant statutes to dispose of Water-
gate connotation).
8 See 1987 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2151 (providing brief account of events which led to
departure of officials under nixon administration).
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from President Nixon, the President ordered the Attorney General
to dismiss Mr. Cox as special prosecutor.' Attorney General Rich-
ardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus re-
fused to effectuate the President's order and thereafter resigned. 10
Eventually, Solicitor General Robert Bork executed the order." In
response to the public outcry, however, President Nixon later ap-
pointed Leon Jaworski as special prosecutor.' 2
As a result of Watergate and President Nixon's authority over
the appointment of a special prosecutor,' 3 Congress promulgated
the Ethics in Government Act' 4 (the "Ethics Act") in 1978, which
provided for the appointment of a prosecutor who would act inde-
pendently of the executive branch. 15 However, Congress failed to
reauthorize this provision of the Ethics Act' 6 before expiring on
December 15, 1992, possibly because of a Republican filibuster.' 7
This occurred although many organizations, such as the American





12 See 1978 REPoRT, supra note 4, at 4218. Leon Jaworski was appointed special prosecu-
tor by President Nixon with assurances of independence in response to the public outcry
over the firing of Archibald Cox. Id.
13 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. Watergate's profound disruption to the country
and the public trust led Congress to conclude that a new mechanism was needed to prose-
cute executive officials. Id. Congress eventually decided on temporary, outside counsels ap-
pointed by a special court, who could be removed by the Attorney General only for good
cause. Id.; 1987 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2151. "This mechanism was the foundation for the
Independent Counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act." Id.; S. REP. No. 496,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537 [hereinafter 1982 RE-
PORT]. Following revelations of abuses and illegal activities by the Nixon Administration,
Congress considered proposals for a statutory process providing for a special prosecutor
outside the Department of Justice. Id.; 1978 REPORT, supra note 4, at 4218. The interest in
establishing an independent special prosecutor was revived after revelations surfaced
about Watergate. Id; see also Brian A. Cromer, Prosecutorial Indiscretion and the United
States Congress: Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Independent Counsel, 77 Ky. L.J. 923,
923 (1988-89). President Nixon's conduct was the catalyst behind the passage of the Ethics
Act. Id.; Kevin R. Morrissey, Comment, Separation of Powers and the Individual, 55
BRooK. L. REv. 965, 965 (1984). In response to the serious doubts the Watergate affair
prompted regarding the ability of the executive branch to investigate itself, Congress
passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Id.
14 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 [hereinafter Eth-
ics Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 28 U.S.C.).
15 Id. at 1867-74 (provisions providing for independent prosecutor).
16 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. (Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1992).
17 See Helen Dewar, G.O.P. Filibuster Threat Kills Independent Counsel Bill, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 30, 1992, at All (explaining that Republican filibuster prevented Congress
from considering bill).
18 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 3 (testimony of Fred Wertheimer, President of Common
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Cause). Mr. Wertheimer noted the importance of the independent counsel:
This year marks the twentieth anniversary of the Watergate scandal, which generated
an extraordinary crisis of public confidence in the integrity of our government and
exposed the inherent conflicts of interest which confront the Department of Justice on
the case of real or alleged wrongdoing by the highest-level officials in the executive
branch. The crisis arising from the firing of the Justice Department's Watergate Spe-
cial Prosecutor Archibald Cox showed the clear need for an independent mechanism to
investigate allegations of criminal activities by the highest-level executive branch
officials.
Id. The Iran-Contra scandal was a classic example of a case where an independent counsel
was essential to conducting a credible investigation. Id. at 6. It was impossible for Attorney
General Edwin Meese and the Justice Department to investigate this matter, and deem
such investigation credible to the American people. Id.; Hearings, supra note 4, at 3 (testi-
mony of Samuel Dash & Irvin B. Nathan on behalf of the American Bar Association). The
independent counsel law is soundly conceived and has operated effectively since its pas-
sage. Id. The American Bar Association believes the statute has proven itself in practice
and should be reauthorized. Id. at 13; 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 6. In 1992, the sub-
committee on Oversight of Government revised the statute's functioning and effectiveness
by studying reports, pleadings, court decisions, conducting personal interviews, hearing
testimony from representatives of the Department of Justice, the American Bar Associa-
tion, Common Cause, and the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. Id. On the basis of this research, the Governmental Affairs Commit-
tee concluded that the independent counsel law was constitutional, served the country well,
and should have been reauthorized. Id; 1987 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2157. The independ-
ent counsel is an effective and essential procedure to investigate those close to the Presi-
dent. Id.; 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3540. The statutory provisions that provide for a
special prosecutor are necessary to guard against conflicts of interest in the investigation of
high-ranking officials. Id. History demonstrates that public confidence is served when one
outside the control of the Justice Department conducts the investigation. Id. at 3541; 1978
REPORT, supra note 4, at 4222. The principal that no man can be a prosecutor in his own
case overrides the policy that the President and the Attorney General must have power to
make discretionary enforcement decisions in situations where the alleged misconduct
involves high-level executive officials. Id. The existence of a statute providing for an in-
dependent counsel guarantees that in a national crisis such an office would come into exist-
ence at an early stage. Id. The existence of a statute providing for a counsel independent of
the executive branch will act as a significant deterrent to situations such as Watergate. Id.
at 4223; see also Carl Gunn, Save the Special Prosecutor Law. Some of its Harshest Critics
Have Called Upon the Law in Times of Need, WASH. PosT, Sept. 27, 1992, at C7. Some of
the harshest critics of the independent counsel law have called upon it in times of need to
defend their innocence and reputation. Id.; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Keep the Special Counsel,
N.Y. TnAEs, June 22, 1992, at A17Congress Must Keep Law on Investigations, USA TODAY,
Oct. 19, 1992, at A14. An independent counsel is necessary when public officials are ac-
cused of misconduct in order to sort facts from politics. Id.; Country Would be Lesser With-
out it, Independent Counsel Law Needs to be Renewed, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 19, 1992, at B6. The
amount of investigations involved in the Iraq scandal enhanced the case for an independ-
ent counsel law. Id.; Premature Death, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 12. Republicans could
use an independent counsel under a Democratic administration. Id. Weinberg's indictment
demonstrates the need for an independent counsel law Id. But see 1992 REPORT, supra note
2, at 7. The Department of Justice is strongly opposed to such legislation. Id. Deputy Attor-
ney General George Terwilliger testified that the law is an affront to the integrity of the
Department because it assumes that professional prosecutors of the Department cannot
successfully investigate executive officials. Id.; Dewar, supra note 17, at All. A Republican
filibuster in Congress terminated any chance of renewal for independent counsel law, and
the bill also faced possible veto by President Bush. Id.; Fein, supra note 4, at 14; Bretton G.
Sciaroni, Law that Deserved to Die, WASH. PosT, Oct. 25, 1992, at C7. The Watergate scan-
dal cannot be a sound basis for the law's rationale because it was resolved without an
independent counsel. Id. Excesses like the $40 million investigation into Iran-Contra affair
cannot be tolerated. Id. Independent counsels are zealots seeking royalties and fame
through the prosecution of elaborated figures. Id.; Ronald J. Ostrow & Robert L. Jackson,
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This Note provides a broad overview of the independent counsel
provisions of the Ethics Act. Part One discusses the legislative
history of the provisions, their procedural operation, and the sub-
sequent amendments that have been enacted. Part Two examines
the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions in light
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Morrison v. 01-
son.19 Part Three demonstrates the application of the provisions
against the background of prior government investigations and
explores certain limitations. Finally, this Note advocates the re-
enactment of the independent counsel provisions and suggests
modifications to improve their effectiveness.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ETHICS ACT
The purpose of the Ethics Act was to create and reorganize cer-
tain agencies of the Federal Government and to enhance the pro-
bity of public officials and institutions.20 The Ethics Act was com-
prised of seven Titles,21 but it was Title V122 which created the
independent counsel provisions and has received the greatest at-
tention since 1978. This is attributable to the significant role that
Efficiency, Ethics of 1978 Independent Counsel Law Questions Congress-Critics Who Want
to Kill the Measure Cite the $33 Million Iran-Contra Case as Example of Excess, L.A. Tuxms,
Sept. 20, 1992, at A4. The use of independent counsel is too expensive, achieves "paltry"
results, and makes criminal cases out of political judgment calls. Id.; Dan K. Webb, Politics
Ignored in Iraqgate Decision, Cm. TmB., Sept. 2, 1992, at 18. The Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations were opposed to the statute. Id.
19 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
20 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1824. The
Ethics Act was enacted "to establish certain Federal agencies, effect certain reorganiza-
tions of the Federal Government, to implement certain reforms in the operation of the Fed-
eral Government and to preserve and promote the integrity of public officials and institu-
tions ... . "Id.
21 Id. at 1824-85. The first three titles of the Ethics Act dealt with legislative, executive,
and judicial financial disclosure requirements. Id. at 1824-6 1; see 1978 REPORT, supra note
4, at 4237-38. There was a need to increase public confidence in government, demonstrate
the high level of integrity of government officials, and deter conflicts of interest. Id. Title IV
created the Office of Government Ethics to provide guidance for the monitoring of financial
disclosure and to issue clear standards of conduct. Id. at 4246-47. Title V dealt with restric-
tions on conduct of ex-officials and ex-employees of the executive branch. Id. at 4247; Ethics
in Goverrunent Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-85. Title VI created the
independent special prosecutor. Id.; 1978 REPORT, supra note 4, at 4221-23. Congress deter-
mined that the Department of Justice could not adequately investigate high-level officials,
and that a lawyer should avoid the appearance of conflict of interest. Id.; Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1875-85 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 28 U.S.C.). The last title of the Act (Title VII) established
the Congressional legal counsel. Id.
22 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-75.
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, and 28 U.S.C.) (independent coun-
sel provisions).
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Title VI played during the administrations of Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George Bush.23
A. Operation of the Independent Counsel Provisions
Under the Ethics Act, the President, Vice-President, executive
officers, and other high-ranking government officials were subject
to investigation.24 An investigation was commenced if the Attor-
ney General received specific information that a person falling
under the scope of the statute "ha[d] committed a violation of any
Federal criminal law other than a violation constituting a petty
offense."25 If the information was factually supported, the Attor-
ney General was required to conduct a preliminary investigation 26
not exceeding ninety days.27 If the alleged violation was "so un-
substantiated that no further investigation or prosecution [was]
warranted,"28 the Attorney General was required to notify the
Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia that an independent counsel should not be ap-
pointed.29 However, if the matter warranted further investigation,
the Attorney General was to petition the Special Division for the
appointment of an independent counsel.3 ° Upon such application,
the Special Division would appoint an independent counsel, and
determine the scope of the counsel's jurisdiction.3 '
The Ethics Act provided that the independent counsel would
have all of the investigative and prosecutorial authority of the At-
23 See Thomas J. Satery, The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 and Subsequent Reforms:
The Effect of Political and Practical Influences on the Creation of Public Policy, 13 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 243, 247 (1990) (stating special prosecutor provisions have received most
attention and generated most controversy); see also infra notes 92-123 and accompanying
text (discussing the application of the Independent Counsel provisions during the Reagan
and Bush administrations).
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (1993) (such individuals would present most serious conflict of
interest).
25 Id. § 591(a).
26 Id. § 592(b)-(c) (standard for requiring preliminary investigation was subsequently re-
vised because it did not consider credibility of source); see infra notes 47-48 and accompany-
ing text (stating prior standard would require investigation even if allegations were
groundless).
27 See id. § 592(a).
28 See id. § 592(b)(1) (standard subjected public officials to unfair investigations and was
therefore revised); see infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (discussing particular rea-
sons why standard was unfair and how it was subsequently revised).
29 Id. § 592(b)(1).
30 Id. § 592(c)(1).
31 Id. § 593(b).
1993]
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torney General. 2 Congress was given "oversight jurisdiction,"
which allowed it to petition for the appointment of an independent
counsel.33 Also, the independent counsel could only be removed
through an impeachment procedure or if the Attorney General de-
termined that the independent counsel was unable to fulfill his or
her duties due to "extraordinary impropriety, physical disability,
mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially im-
pair[ed] the performance of such special prosector's duties."34 Re-
moval of the independent counsel, however, was subject to judicial
review.35 Lastly, the independent counsel was terminated when it
either completed or substantially completed its investigatory or
prosecutorial functions. 6
B. Amendments
After the Ethics Act enactment, situations arose necessitating
revisions to particular independent counsel provisions. 3v For ex-
ample, under section 592, unless the matter was so unsubstanti-
ated that no further investigation was warranted, the Attorney
General was required to apply for an independent counsel.3
Under criminal investigations not concerning executive officers,
the Department of Justice has broad discretion in deciding
whether or not to prosecute individuals. 39 However, under section
592, the Attorney General was required to appoint an independ-
32 See 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1993). Such power includes conducting proceedings before
grand juries, engaging in litigation, appealing any decision, reviewing documentary evi-
dence, receiving national security clearances, and conducting prosecutions. Id.
33 Id. § 595(d). Congress could request for the appointment of a special prosecutor. Id.
§ 595(e). The Attorney General was required to report back any action it had taken and, if
the Attorney General refused to apply to the Special Division, he or she had to give the
reasons underlying this decision. Id.
34 Id. § 596(a)(1) (such restriction could be unconstitutional infringement on Attorney
General's authority); see infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing constitu-
tional problems with legislature restricting removal power of another branch of
government).
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) (independent counsel may obtain review of removal in civil
action and seek reinstatement).
36 Id. § 596(b)(1)-(2). Investigations and prosecutions are completed or substantially
completed to the extent that it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to com-
plete such investigations and prosecutions. Id.
37 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3539 (discussing criticism resulting from two cases
involving officials in President Jimmy Carter's administration).
38 See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (stating Attorney General must apply to division of court for
appointment of independent counsel).
39 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3550. The Department of Justice does not have to
prosecute every alleged crime, even if there is sufficient evidence. Id.
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ent counsel. 40 Thus, under this section, it was unfair that public
officials were subject to investigations that others would normally
be free from.4 '
In 1982, the Ethics Act was amended 42 to promote public confi-
dence in the investigation of high-level officials.43 For instance,
the 1982 amendment revised the standard for appointing an in-
dependent counsel to prevent unfair investigations of public offi-
cials by requiring the appointment only if the Attorney General
found there were "reasonable grounds" to believe that further in-
vestigation was warranted.4 4 This meant the Attorney General
was to comply with the established policies of the Justice Depart-
ment.4" In addition, the standard for commencing a preliminary
investigation was also revised.46 The previous standard required
"specific information" regardless of the credibility of the source.47
The amendment required the Attorney General to also consider
the credibility of the source by employing methods normally used
by the Department of Justice to determine the reliability of a
source.4 Also, the 1982 amendment provided that the term "spe-
cial prosecutor" be replaced throughout the Act with "independent
counsel" in an attempt to dispose of the Watergate connotation.49
Furthermore, Congress believed that the Ethics Act should en-
compass the President's family because a conflict of interest could
arise if the Attorney General was to investigate a member of the
President's family.50 Therefore, the Ethics Act was revised to au-
40 Id. at 3551.
41 Id. Under President Carter's administration, White House Chief of Staff Hamilton
Jordan and Carter's Campaign Manager Timothy Kraft were alleged to have illegally pos-
sessed cocaine. Id. Under the facts involved, the Department of Justice was unlikely to
prosecute. Id. Although indictments were not issued in either case, the Attorney General
had to appoint a special prosecutor. Id.
42 The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat.
2039 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1982)).
43 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3537 (stating another purpose was to remedy pres-
ent law).
44 Id. at 3551.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 3548.
47 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3547. This meant that any allegation, even an
unreliable one, could trigger a preliminary investigation. Id. Public confidence would not be
served by investigating groundless allegations precipitated by unreliable sources. Id. at
3548. The previous standard wasted resources by requiring high priority investigations in
situations where there would otherwise be none. Id.
48 Id. at 3548.
49 Id. at 3554.
50 Id. at 3544. President Carter's brother, Billy, was alleged to have been involved in
illegal dealings with the Libyan government. Id. Although there was seemingly no evidence
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thorize the Attorney General to use an independent counsel upon
determination that an investigation by the Department of Justice
"[would] result in a personal, financial or political conflict of inter-
est."5 In addition, the length of time a person could be subject to
investigation under the original statute was deemed by Congress
to be unfair, 2 and it was substantially reduced by the 1982
amendments.5 3
Another important revision to the independent counsel provi-
sions involved the standard for removal of an independent coun-
sel.54 There may be a constitutional issue in limiting the Attorney
General's power to remove because removal may be a purely exec-
utive function, and thus, not subject to any limitations established
by Congress. 55 Previously, the Attorney General could have re-
moved an independent counsel only for "extraordinary impropri-
ety,"56 but under the amendment, this standard was changed to
"good cause."57 This change, it was believed, enhanced the consti-
tutionality of the statute by expanding the Attorney General's
power of removal.58
The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987 created
further amendments to the independent counsel provisions of the
Ethics Act.5 9 These amendments included a time limit on "thresh-
old" inquiries conducted by independent counsels, and a recusal
requirement in instances where the Attorney General may be per-
that the Department of Justice accorded Billy any special treatment because of his rela-
tionship with the President, questions existed as to whether this was really the case. Id. In
any event, the public may be justified in feeling that the Department of Justice is unable to
fairly conduct an investigation of a member of the President's family. Id.
51 Id. at 3545.
52 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3546. Under § 591(b)(5) of the Ethics Act, officials
were subject to the special prosecutor requirements for the entire incumbency of the Presi-
dent under which he or she served plus the entire incumbency of the next President if they
were from the same political party. Id. The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee chided
this provision as unfair because it held an officer subject to the independent counsel proce-
dure long after the dangers of the conflict of interest passed. Id.
53 Id. at 3547 (reducing period to President's incumbency plus one year "cooling off"
period).
54 Id. at 3553.
5 See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's view on the
Attorney General's power of removal).
56 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 3553 (independent counsel could only have been
removed for extraordinary impropriety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or a condi-
tion that substantially impaired his or her performance).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-191, § 2, 101
Stat. 1293 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 & 5 U.S.C. app. (1987)).
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sonally or financially involved. 0
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
PROVISIONS
The most controversial aspect of the independent counsel provi-
sions is their constitutionality. 6 ' Despite previous constitutional
60 See Satery, supra note 23, at 260-62. Special prosecutors had conducted extended
"threshold" inquiries in deciding whether a preliminary investigation would be necessary.
Id. at 262. More often than not, it was decided that further proceedings were necessary. Id.
at 260-61. To prevent this problem, a 15-day limit was placed on the threshold investiga-
tion. Id. at 262. Also, the Attorney General would recuse himself upon receiving informa-
tion concerning someone with whom he had a personal or financial relationship. Id. at 263.
61 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-96 (1988) (holding independent counsel pro-
visions of Ethics Act do not violate Appointment Clause, Article III, nor principle of separa-
tion of powers); Carolyn M. Corry, On the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Pro-
visions of the Ethics in Government Act: Do They Comport with the Separation of Powers?,
26 DuQ. L. REV. 715, 720-31 (1988) (analyzing constitutional problem as Morrison majority
did); Peter J. Garofalo, Requiring the Executive Branch to Share Control Over the
Prosecutorial Function: Morrison v. Olson, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 187, 215-20 (1988) (argu-
ing Act forces executive branch to share control over prosecutorial function, but does so
without throwing government off constitutional balance); Robert G. Solloway, The Institu-
tionalized Wolf An Analysis of the Unconstitutionality of the Independent Counsel Provi-
sions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 21 IND. L. REV. 955, 978-82 (1988) (claiming
provisions violate separation of powers doctrine, and gives Congress unprecedented role in
policing executive branch); Keith Werhan, Toward an Eclectic Approach to Separation of
Powers: Morrison v. Olson Examined, 16 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 393, 444-48 (1988) (assert-
ing Morrison Court correctly combined formalism and functionalism in its approach, how-
ever, a better standard is necessary); Symposium, A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Ad-
dressing the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255,
255-93 (1989) (presenting various constitutional and policy reasons explaining why Morri-
son was either correctly or incorrectly decided); Laura L. Cox, Note, Political Accountability
and the Independent Counsel:A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing?, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1496-98
(1989) (claiming that although Morrison Court deviated from its recent "formalistic" ap-
proach to separation of powers questions, case was distinguishable and correctly decided);
Donald A. Daugherty, Comment, The Separation of Powers and Abuses in Prosecutorial
Discretion; Morrison v. Olson 108 S. Ct. 2597, 79 J. Cins. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 995
(1988) (stating Morrison Court incorrectly considered only technical, formal aspects of in-
dependent counsel provisions, and did not realize that practical implementation resulted in
substantial intrusion into President's responsibilities); Peter B. Davidson, Note, Chipping
Away at the President's Control Over His Administration: An Analysis of Morrison v. Olson
and Beyond, 6 J. L. & POL. 205, 221-26 (1989) (claiming that Morrison Court reached cor-
rect holding by properly rejecting certain precedent, but it failed to give adequate test to
resolve constitutional problems involved); J. Andrew Kinsey, Comment, The Court Upholds
the Constitutional Validity of the Independent Counsel Statute-Morrison v. Olson, 7
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 347, 372 (1989) (arguing that although independent counsel pro-
visions remove power from President, it is constitutionally permitted structural change);
Alton L. Lightsey, Note, Constitutional Law: The Independent Counsel and the Supreme
Court's Separation of Powers Jurisprudence, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 563, 584 (1988) (asserting
independent counsel provisions are both unconstitutional and unnecessary because consti-
tuted structures already fulfilled purpose of independent counsel); Morrissey, supra note
13, at 965, 986-89 (arguing independent counsel provisions wrongly permit Congress to
strip President of significant power); Edward Susolik, Note, Separation of Powers and Lib-
erty: The Appointments Clause, Morrison v. Olson, and Rule of Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1515, 1566 (1990) (agreeing with opponents of independent counsel to extent that strict
understanding of separation of powers is necessary condition for maximizing liberty).
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challenges to these provisions,62 it was not until 1987 that the
Supreme Court resolved the issue in Morrison v. Olson.63
In Morrison, Theodore Olson, an official with the Attorney
General's Office, was suspected of perjury before the House Judici-
ary Committee during an investigation of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency.6 The Department of Justice requested and was
granted the appointment of an independent counsel.65 When sub-
poenas were issued to Mr. Olson, his counsel claimed that the in-
dependent counsel provisions were unconstitutional.6 6 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the
provisions were constitutional.67 The Supreme Court upheld the
District Court's ruling.6
One of the constitutional issues involved in Morrison concerned
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, 9 which requires
that principal officers be appointed by the President.7 ° Counsel for
Mr. Olson argued that if an independent counsel is a principal of-
ficer, then the Ethics Act was unconstitutional 7' because the in-
dependent counsel was not appointed by the President but by the
Special Division of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
62 See In re Sealed Case, 829 F.2d 50, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1027
(1988). During Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh's investigation of the Iran-Contra
affair, former National Security Council staff member, Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North,
argued that the independent counsel provisions were unconstitutional. Id. North argued
that allowing the Attorney General to remove Walsh only for cause injured North and was
unconstitutional. Id. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia held that the issues involved could be resolved without addressing the constitu-
tional aspect. Id. at 62; see also Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 66 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 829 (1987). Former White House Deputy Chief of Staff, Michael Deaver, also chal-
lenged the statute during his investigation, but his challenges failed. Id. The court asserted
that the constitutional challenge could not be raised in a pre-indictment civil injunctive
action. Id. at 70.
63 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
64 Id. at 666.
65 Id. at 667.
66 Id. at 688.
67 See In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp 56, 60-61 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding statute did not
violate doctrine of separation of powers), rev'd, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
68 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 654.
69 See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Article II provides, in pertinent part:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided-for, and which shall be established by Law; but the Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
Id.
70 Id.
71 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671.
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Columbia.72 However, if the independent counsel was determined
to be an inferior officer, the Ethics Act would not violate the Ap-
pointments Clause.73
The Supreme Court, relying on United States v. Germaine,74
reasoned that the independent counsel, Alexia Morrison, was an
inferior officer because she could have been removed by a higher
executive branch official, had limited duties, and was limited in
jurisdiction and tenure.75 Justice Antonin Scalia, in a well-known
and controversial dissent, argued that the independent counsel
was a principal officer.76 He thought that the independent counsel
should not have been classified as an inferior officer when she was
more difficult to remove than most principal officers.77 Justice
Scalia also stated the majority mischaracterized the extent of an
independent counsel's authority.78
72 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text (discussing operation of statute).
73 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670-71 (stating initial question is whether independent counsel
is principal or inferior officer).
74 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1878) (noting factors to be considered include "the ideas of tenure,
duration, emolument, and duties...").
75 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 671-72. The Court noted that although Morrison had independ-
ent powers, the power of removal vested in the Attorney General indicated some degree of
inferiority in rank. Id. at 671. Independent counsel has no authority to formulate govern-
ment policy or to perform duties unnecessary to operate its office. Id. at 671-72. Independ-
ent counsel can only act within the scope of the jurisdiction granted by the Special Division.
Id. at 672. When an independent counsel's single task is over, the office terminates. Id.
76 Id. at 716-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attempting to rebut each reason offered by major-
ity); see also infra notes 77-78 (discussing Justice Scalia's reasons for asserting independ-
ent counsel is principal officer).
77 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 716 (principal officers may be removed by President at will).
78 Id. The independent counsel has the same powers as Department of Justice officials.
Id. at 716-17. Justice Scalia also argued that although the independent counsel does not
formulate policy for the government, neither does any other officer of the government, bar-
ring the President. Id. at 718. There is nothing unusually limited about the independent
counsel's tenure and jurisdiction. Id.
For Supreme Court cases dealing with the appointment of various principal and inferior
officers, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 127-32 (1976) (holding Congress violated Appoint-
ments Clause by creating Federal Elections Commission whose officers were charged with
regulating campaign expenditures); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628-
29 (1935) (holding Federal Trade Commission is both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
agency, and therefore its members act independently of executive and may not be removed
by President except for good cause); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
352-53 (1931) (holding United States Commissioners are inferior officers).
For discussions concerning the distinction between principal and inferior officers, see
Corry, supra note 61, at 735-43 (arguing precedent supports idea that independent counsel
is inferior officer); Garofalo, supra note 61, at 218 (agreeing with Court's decision, but.ad-
mitting independent counsel may not be subordinate officer); Eric R. Glitzenstein & Alan
B. Morrison, The Supreme Court's Decision in Morrison v. Olson: A Common Sense Applica-
tion of the Constitution a Practical Problem, 38 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 362-66 (1989) (agreeing
with Court's decision while admitting independent counsel may not be subordinate officer);
Solloway, supra note 61, at 969-73 (arguing method of appointment violates separation of
powers based on case law and tradition).
574 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:561
However, the more significant constitutional question in Morri-
son dealt with whether the independent counsel provisions vio-
lated the separation of powers doctrine. 71 Mr. Olson's counsel ar-
gued that the restriction of the Attorney General's power to
remove an independent counsel was an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with the President's executive power.8 0 The Morrison Court
held that this restriction did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine. 8 ' Although the Court recognized the importance of the
separation of powers doctrine, the Court stated that this separa-
tion was not absolute.s2 The Court determined that the focus must
be on whether the restriction impermissibly interfered with the
President's duties and not necessarily whether the individual was
a "purely executive" officer.8 3 Unlike previous cases, which held
that the separation of powers doctrine was violated, 4 in Morrison
79 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating Court should have fo-
cused primarily on separation of powers and secondarily on Appointments Clause and re-
moval power).
80 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93. The Court asserted that a restriction on the removal
power of the Attorney General is not unconstitutional. Id. It considered different lines of
precedent in reaching its decision. Id. at 685-88. In Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)
and Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), attempts by Congress to involve itself in
removal of executive officials were found unconstitutional. Id. at 686. The Court stated that
in Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), wherein the Court, while not
allowing Congress to involve itself in the removal of Commissioners of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), allowed it to restrict the President's power to remove at least in regard
to quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies. Id. at 687. The Court considered Wiener v.
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958), in which the President could not remove a member of
the War Claims Commission just to appoint someone else he wanted to be on the Commis-
sion, when the Commissioners were entrusted with power to be free from executive control.
Id. at 688. Appellees contended that Humphrey's Ex'r and Wiener apply when there is a
"quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" official and Meyers applies when a "purely executive"
official is involved like an independent counsel. Id. at 688-89.
81 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-93.
82 Id. at 693-94. The Court has not hesitated to invalidate a law which has violated the
separation of powers principle. Id. 'While the Constitution diffuses power the better to
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, au-
tonomy but reciprocity." Id. at 694 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
83 Id. at 691. Although the Court admitted that it did rely on terms such as "quasi-legis-
lative" and "quasi-judicial" in past cases, it states that the analyses involved were not
meant to create strict categories of officials who may or may not be removed by the Presi-
dent. Id. at 689. While the functions served by the officials are relevant, the most impor-
tant concern is whether the President can perform his constitutional duty. Id. at 691. "[We]
cannot say that the imposition of a "good cause" standard for removal by itself unduly
trammels on executive authority." Id.
84 See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722-23. The Court stated that Congress cannot have an ac-
tive role in the supervision of executive roles. Id. at 722. This would be inconsistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 723. To allow the Comptroller General to exe-
cute the laws is equivalent to allowing a congressional veto. Id. at 726. This is constitution-
ally impermissible. Id. at 727; INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-59 (1983). A statute al-
lowing for a congressional one-house veto is unconstitutional because it violates separation
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there was no attempt by Congress, in restricting the President's
control, to increase its own powers and usurp executive func-
tions.8 5 In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that because the stat-
ute deprives the President of exclusive control over a purely exec-
utive function, it impermissibly interfered with the President's
powers.8 6
Although there has been much debate over the constitutionality
of the statute, the American Bar Association, 7 Common Cause,88
the Committee on Governmental Affairs,8 9 and the Supreme
Court of the United States90 have endorsed the constitutionality of
the independent counsel provisions, and objections such as those
made by Justice Scalia have not been left unanswered. 91 Despite
of powers principles. Id. at 956-59. All legislation must be presented to the President before
becoming law. Id. at 945-46. Congress must also concur. Id. at 948; see also Meyers, 272
U.S. at 161. The power of Congress to remove executive postmasters does not conform with
the intent of the framers of the Constitution. Id.
85 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 686 (stating Morrison was different than other cases wherein
Congress attempted to gain role in removal of executive officials).
86 Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that Article II of the Constitu-
tion, which provides that "the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States" means "all" of the executive power, not "some" of it. Id. "It is not for us to determine,
and we have never presumed to determine, how much of the purely executive powers of
government must be within the full control of the President. The Constitution prescribes
that they all are." Id. at 709. It is not relevant how much the statute reduces the control of
the President. Id. at 708. Complete control over investigations and prosecutions is a consti-
tutional duty of the President. Id. at 710.
87 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 9 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irvin B. Nathan on
behalf of the American Bar Association) (arguing that independent counsel provisions
strengthen checks and balances system).
88 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 1-2 (testimony of Fred Wertheimer, president of Com-
mon Cause) (accepting that constitutional issues were resolved by Supreme Court).
89 See 1987 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2155.
The committee has found the arguments of the Department of Justice, Mr. Smith, and
other critics of the independent counsel statute to be unpersuasive, based upon an
examination of the law's effective operation since 1982 and other expert analyses of the
constitutional issues, including recent findings by three courts that the statute is likely
to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Id.90 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 696-97.
91 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 5 (testimony of Katy J. Harriger). Ms. Harriger
testified:
Many of the arguments of critics still follow this incorrect underlying constitutional
assumption. In particular, the criticism that the independent arrangement lacks polit-
ical accountability derives from a theory of the separation of powers embodied in Jus-
tice Scalia's dissent in Morrison. This theory assumes that government powers are
neatly compartmentalized, that the lines between the branches are clearly delineated,
and that no overlap or blending of powers is permitted. This theory ignores not only
James Madison's understanding of the separation of powers but also the reality of how
the separation of powers operates in practice.
Id.; see also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Fed-
eral Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 489 (1989). Justice Scalia did not support Chief
Justice Rehnquist's statement that "[tihere is no real dispute that functions performed by
the independent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement func-
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the numerous constitutional challenges to the independent coun-
sel provisions of the Ethics Act, these provisions withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny, and any objections made to the use of an in-
dependent counsel pursuant to those provisions must be made on
grounds other than a lack of constitutionality.
III. RECENT APPLICATION OF THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL
PROVISIONS
A. The Iran-Contra Investigation
During the fourteen years that the independent counsel provi-
sions were in existence, they were used to appoint eleven in-
dependent counsels.92 The most publicized and controversial of
these appointments involved Lawrence Walsh's investigation93
into the trading of arms by members of President Reagan's admin-
istration to Iran, in exchange for American hostages.94 After five
tions that typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch." Id.
(quoting Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (1988)). The author notes that Justice Scalia must not
be aware that executives perform different functions, and that the Constitution gives a
prosecutorial role in the impeachment process to the House of Representatives. Id.
92 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. During the first four years (1978-1982), the In-
dependent Counsel Act was used to appoint three independent counsels. Id. The first of the
three counsels was Arthur Hill Christy (11/79-5/80) who investigated Hamilton Jordon. Id.
There was no indictment and the investigation incurred $182,000 in expenses. Id. Next to
be appointed was Gerald Gallinghouse (12/80-3/81) who investigated Timothy Kraft. Id.
Again there was no indictment but the cost was only $3,300. Id. Lastly, Leon Silverman
investigated Ray Donovan (12181-9/82 and 6/85-10/87). Id. The cost of this investigation
was $326,000 and there was no indictment. Id.
In the second five years there were seven independent counsels. Id. First, was Jacob A.
Stein (4/84-9/84) who investigated Edwin Meese at a cost of $312,000. Id. Mr. Meese was
not indicted. Id. Next, was the appointment of Alexia Morrison to investigate Theodore
Olson (5/86-3/89). Id. Olson challenged the constitutionality of the provisions. Id. Although
there was no indictment, the constitutionality of the statute was upheld with a cost of $1.5
million. Id. A conviction was finally obtained with the appointment of Whitney N. Seymore
(5/86-6/89). Id. Mr. Seymore convicted Michael Deaver at a cost of $1.5 million. Id. Then
came the appointment of Lawrence Walsh (12/86-present) to the Iran-Contra scandal,
which has resulted in fourteen indictments and a cost of $32.5 million. Id. Following Walsh
came the Wedtech investigation conducted by James McKay (2/87-1/90). Id. This resulted
in two indictments, one acquittal, and one conviction after trial (overturned on appeal), at a
cost of $2.6 million. Id. Lastly, there were two confidential appointments. Id. Both investi-
gations ended without indictments and costs of $17,000 and $46,000 respectively. Id. Since
1988, there has been only one appointment. Id. Arlin Adams (3/90-present) is investigating
the HUD scandal. Id. There have been ten indictments, and two guilty pleas, with eight
more trials upcoming, and these costs approximate $6.9 million to date. Id.
93 See Taylor, supra note 18, at 5 (opponents and supporters of independent counsel pro-
visions use Walsh's performance to bolster their views).
94 See William F. Buckley, Jr., Making Crimes Out of Misjudgments, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 16, 1992, at 31. The Boland Amendment was circumvented by funnelling funds from
the sale of military equipment via Israel to El Salvador to assist the Contras. Id.; see also
Peter Kornbluh et al., Ollie Oops: He Says He's Exonerated. The Record Says He's a Crook;
Oliver North of the Iran-Contra Scandal, 23 WAsH. MONTHLY 33 (1991). The investigation
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years and expenditures totaling $32.5 million, Mr. Walsh's inves-
tigation ended with four convictions, seven guilty pleas, and one
dismissal.95
The duration and expense of the Iran-Contra investigation
brought criticism concerning the Walsh inquiry,96 as well as skep-
ticism about the use of the independent counsel provisions.97 In
led to charges being filed against Mr. North that included withholding information from
Congress, conspiracy, making false statements to officials, and obstruction of Congress. Id.
95 See United States v. Clines 958, F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1992). Mr. Clines was found guilty
of filing false tax returns, which did not include income obtained from the arms deals. Id.;
United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 369-71 (D.C. Cir. 1991). John M. Poindexter was
found guilty on five felony counts, including conspiracy and obstruction of Congress. Id.
Poindexter's conviction was also reversed on appeal. Id. at 388; United States v. North, 910
F.2d 843, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Out of the twelve counts Oliver North was charged with, he
was only convicted of aiding and abetting the administration's effort to deceive Congress;
altering and destroying documents; and accepting an illegal gratuity. Id. However, his con-
viction was reversed by the Circuit Court because the lower court allowed North's testi-
mony during Congressional hearings to be used against him at trial even though he had
received immunity. Id. at 853-68; United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 470 (4th Cir.
1989). The case against Joseph Fernandez was thrown out when the Attorney General re-
fused to provide classified information which would have been used in open court. Id. The
court held that the CIPA blocked this information from being released. Id.; Kornbluh,
supra at 94. Mr. Clines faces the longest prison term of any Iran-Contra defendant, 16
months. Id.; Kornbluh, supra note 94 at 33. The following individuals pled guilty: Alan D.
Fiers, withholding information from Congress; Elliot Abrams, withholding information
from Congress; Carl "Spitz" Channell, conspiracy to defraud the United States; Richard R.
Miller, conspiracy to defraud the United States; Richard V. Secord, false statements to
Congress; Albert Hakim, misdemeanor count of supporting North's salary. Id. In addition,
Lake Resources, of which Hakim was a principal shareholder, pled guilty to theft of govern-
ment property. Id.; see also Evan Thomas et al., Pardon Me, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at
14-18. Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan's former national security advisor, pled
guilty to withholding information from Congress. Id. at 15. He was sentenced to two years
probation, 200 hours of community service, and fined $20,000. Id.
On Christmas Eve in 1992, President Bush pardoned Caspar W. Weinberger, Duane
Clarridge, Clair George, Robert McFarlane, Elliot Abrahms, and Alan Fiers by way of his
power to grant pardons for offenses against the United States under the U.S. Const. art. II,
§ 2. Id. Caspar W. Weinberger, the former Defense Secretary, was awaiting trial in Janu-
ary, 1993 on charges of perjury, making false statements, and obstructing congressional
investigators. Id. Duane Clarridge, a former CIA agent and former head of covert opera-
tions in Latin America, was awaiting trial on charges of making false statements and ob-
structing inquiries into the Iran-Contra affair. Id. The benefit from these pardons is that
Mr. Walsh can call these men as witnesses in other Iran-Contra trials, and since they have
been pardoned, they may not take the fifth. Id. They may also be charged with perjury if
they do not tell the truth on the stand. Id.
96 See David Johnston, Proud, Unbowed and Unpopular: Special Prosecutor Makes His
Case, N.Y. TrAs, Sept. 27, 1992, at D7. Critics have called Walsh an "inept zealot, spend-
ing millions of dollars analyzing the activities of the Reagan administration." Id. Senator
Alan K Simpson described him as "a stumbling, bumbling prosecutor." Id.; see also David
Johnston, Counsel is Ending Arms-Sale Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1992, at Al. Even
those who supported Walsh's effort stated that during the investigation he belabored over
an issue that undermined President Reagan's final years in office and became less urgent
as the contra issue faded and the American hostages were released from Lebanon. Id.
97 See Claudia MacLachlan, The End of Independent Counsels?, NAT'L L.J., July 20,
1992, at 1, 35. "Iran-Contra shows all the flaws of the statute." Id. Supporters and oppo-
nents of the Independent Counsel law agree that it must be revised, either by adding re-
porting requirements, deadlines, or some budget oversight. Id.
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addition, this investigation exposed inherent problems with the
Ethics Act,9" including access to classified information.99 The
Classified Information Procedures Act (the "CIPA")100 barred Mr.
Walsh from such classified information and prevented the convic-
tion of Joseph Fernandez, a former CIA station chief in Costa
Rica. 10 1 Mr. Fernandez notified the court that he intended to re-
quest and introduce classified information during his trial.10 2 The
circuit court affirmed the district court's refusal to allow the in-
dependent counsel to provide Mr. Fernandez with unclassified
summaries of the classified documents requested. 10 3 The charges
against Mr. Fernandez were dismissed because Walsh could not
properly try Mr. Fernandez without this information. l0 4
Because neither the CIPA nor the independent counsel provi-
sions provided for this substitution, the circuit court determined
that the independent counsel could not gain access to classified
information, which the Attorney General refused to disclose. 0 5 As
a result, in a case involving a high-level official, the CIPA caused
the unintended result of shielding an official from prosecution in-
98 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 11 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irving B. Nathan).
Some of the obstacles imposed upon Walsh during his inquiry included national security
concerns, classification issues, and immunity problems. Id.
99 See Sandra D. Jordan, Classified Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel
Prosecutions: Balancing the Scales of Justice After Iran-Contra, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1651
(1991) (discussing interplay between classified information and independent counsel
statute).
100 Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1988)). The statute
provides in its pertinent part:
§ 4. Discovery of classified information by defendants. The court, upon a sufficient
showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified items of classified infor-
mation from documents to be made available to the defendant through discovery under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to substitute a summary of the information
for such classified documents or to substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that
the classified information would tend to prove. The court may permit the United States
to make a request for such authorization in the form of a written statement to be in-
spected by the court alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such
an ex parte showing, the entire text of the statement of the United States shall be
sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available to the appellate
court in the event of an appeal.
Id.
101 See United States v. Fernandez, 887 F.2d 465, 467 (4th Cir. 1989).
102 Id. at 467; see 18 U.S.C. App § 5. This section of the CIPA provides that a defendant
must notify the court of its intent to submit classified information during trial. Id.
103 See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 465.
104 See Jordan, supra note 99, at 1667. The judge dismissed the case because he believed
that Fernandez could not be tried fairly without the classified information. Id.
105 See Fernandez, 887 F.2d at 470. The court reasoned that because of constitutional
concerns this information could not be disclosed to someone who is not fully accountable to
the President. Id. at 471.
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stead of merely keeping certain information confidential.' 016 The
Attorney General's ability to withhold confidential documents ne-
gates the independent counsel's authority and sabotages a prose-
cution through the use of the CIPA.I0 7 For an independent counsel
to be effective, there must be some type of coordination between
these two statutes. 0 8
B. Iraqgate
In order for the Attorney General to have appointed an in-
dependent counsel, the source of the information received must
have been credible and specific.' 0 9 Although this standard was
designed to prevent frivolous investigations, it gave the Attorney
General the sole discretion to determine what information was
credible and specific enough to merit an investigation. 10 Attorney
General William Barr's refusal to appoint an independent counsel
to the "Iraqgate" scandal illustrates the difficulties with the provi-
sion. '1 Iraqgate involved loans to Iraq, which were used by Sad-
dam Hussein to obtain weapons immediately prior to the invasion
of Kuwait." 2 President Bush's administration insisted that this
was merely poor policy making, 113 but some unanswered ques-
106 See Jordan, supra note 99, at 1672 (administration may utilize statute to protect its
members from any embarrassment).
107 Id. at 1666. Because of its power to control the release of classified evidence, the
Department of Justice ultimately controls investigations involving high-level officials who
have access to classified information. Id.
108 See id. at 1674. The author, Sandra Jordan, suggests that an independent counsel
should have the power to challenge an affidavit by the Attorney General seeking to block
the release of classified information. Id. She further suggests that a change in procedure
should take place to allow a prosecution to continue while still protecting classified infor-
mation. Id.
109 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (explaining 1982 amendment changed
standard for appointment).
110 Id.
111 See Marcia Chambers, Sua Sponte, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 15 (Barr's decision is
latest example of Justice Department's abuse of prosecutorial discretion); William Saire,
Phone Call Proves the Need for an Independent Iraqgate Counsel, CHi. TRai., July 10, 1992,
at 21; "Can Justice Investigate its Own Manipulation?", Iraqgate Puzzle Needs a Special
Prosecutor, NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 1992, at 56. ("the executive branch can't be counted on to
investigate itself'). But see Webb, supra note 17, at 18 (Barr should be commended for his
decision).
112 See John A. Farrell, "Iraqgate" the Search for a Coverup; Thwarted Queries Focused
Suspicion, BOSTON GLOBE, June 16, 1992, at 1. The Government used U.S. taxpayer money
to lend Iraq billions of dollars with few safeguards. Id. Christopher Drougoul, the manager
of the Atlanta branch of the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, informed agents that he had
given Saddam Hussein four billion dollars in illegal loans and U.S. farm credits. Id.
113 See id. "[Als myopically mistaken our diplomatic efforts may have been, there is no
evidence that policy makers were malevolent or corrupt in implementing this policy. It's
key that a distinction be made between misjudgment and unethical or illegal behavior." Id.
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tions led Congress, the media, and the public to believe that some-
thing illegal occurred. 114
These suspicions resulted in a congressional request to the At-
torney General to appoint an independent counsel. 115 Mr. Barr,
instead, chose to appoint a prosecutor from within the Attorney
General's office, Frederick B. Lacey." 6 Nevertheless, as a member
of the Attorney General's office, Mr. Lacey was under executive
control which posed a threat of a biased investigation."17
Mr. Lacey's appointment triggered a heated political battle be-
tween Congress and President Bush's administration."18 Attorney
General Barr justified the appointment of Mr. Lacey, stating that
the information received was not substantial enough to seek
independent counsel. 119 The main purpose of the independent
counsel provisions was to provide impartial investigations of gov-
ernment officials. 120 Although Attorney General Barr may have
114 See id. Drogoul's indictment was delayed for 15 months after the Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro was raided. Id. When the General Accounting Office of Congress tried to investi-
gate the bank scandal, they did not receive full cooperation from the agencies involved. Id.
There is also evidence that export licenses granted by the government for the sale of tech-
nology to Iraq may have been altered in order to classify goods as merely "commercial" and
not "military." Id.
115 See id. at 11. The House Judicial Committee requested an independent counsel after
conducting hearings in which C. Boyden Gray and Robert Mosbacher, chairmen of Presi-
dent Bush's campaign, appeared. Id.; Peter Truell, Democrats Call for Independent Counsel
to Probe Handling of U.S. Policy on Iraq, WAL ST. J., July 10, 1992, at A8. Twenty of the
twenty-one members of the House Judicial Committee asked the Attorney General to ap-
point an independent counsel "to investigate serious allegations of possible violations of
federal criminal statutes" by high-ranking officials with regard to dealings with Iraq. Id.116 See Andrew Blum, "Iraqgate" Prosecutor Known as a Maverick, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 2,
1992, at 10 (Frederick B. Lacey, a former federal judge, has taken on public officials, the
mob and the teamsters).
117 See William Safire, Don't Let White House Block Iraqgate Probe, DET. FREE PRESS,
July 10, 1992, at All. "Barr could claim ... that no evidence of wrongdoing existed, but
such bald-faced cover-up would invite impeachment." Id.; William Safire, Iraqgate: Cover-
up in Justice Continues the Attorney General Has Shown He Cannot Investigate Himself or
His Coconspirators, DET. FREE PRESS, Oct. 13, 1992 at A9. "Never in the history of the
Republic .... has the Nation's chief law enforcement officer been in such flagrant and
sustained violation of the law." Id. But see Buckley, supra note 94, at 31 (admitting Bush
Administration dealt with Iraq using bad tactics but not criminal acts).
118 See Robert Pear, Justice Department Rebuffs Democrats on Special Persecutor on
Iraq Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1992, at Al. "Mr. Barr is playing a dangerous political game
in a desperate effort to protect the Bush Administration." Id. (quoting Representative
Henry B. Gonzalez of Texas, chairman of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and
Urban Affairs); Mr. Barr's decision was "stonewalling, plain and simple." Id. (quoting Rep-
resentative Jack Brooks, Democrat from Texas, chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee).
119 Id. "The criteria for invoking the independent counsel statute are not present." Id.
(quoting Attorney General William Barr). "[T]here is not a shred of evidence that any de-
partment employee acted improperly." Id.
120 See 1982 REPORT, supra note 13, at 1 (purpose of Ethics Act is to promote public
confidence in impartial investigation of alleged wrongdoings of government officials).
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personally believed that the investigation was unwarranted, he
should have appointed an independent counsel, especially in light
of the congressional and public requests for such an investiga-
tion. 2 ' The criticism surrounding this investigation provided the
public with the impression that the investigation was not objec-
tive. 122 Therefore, opponents would question the outcome of Mr.
Lacey's investigation, regardless of whether it was conducted
properly. 123
A governmental investigation lacking public confidence is value-
less. 124 A change in the independent counsel provisions, to ensure
that the Attorney General does not abuse this discretionary power
to appoint counsel, is necessary to promote the purpose of the
statute.
25
IV. REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ETHICS ACT
A. The Necessity of the Independent Counsel
The Reauthorization Act of 1992 would have extended the ex-
isting independent counsel provisions for another five years.' 26
However, because of the threat of a Republican filibuster, the
Reauthorization Act of 1992 was never voted on by Congress.' 27
Congress stated that the Reauthorization Act was not voted on
because there was not enough time to do so before adjourning.' 21
121 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 8 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irving B. Nathan). Had
the Iran-Contra investigation been conducted by the Justice Department, the public confi-
dence in the Reagan Administration would have been destroyed. Id. The decision to appoint
an independent counsel "avoid[ed] the appearance of any kind of coverup." Id.
122 See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 111, at 15. There is some perception surrounding the
Justice Department that it is partial to government officials and the investigatory proce-
dure is corrupt. Id.; David Corn, Beltway Bandits, THE NATiON, Oct. 12, 1992, at 388. The
Justice Department's response to the Iraqgate scandal was not approved by the public. Id.
123 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 4-5 (testimony of Fred Wertheimer). "The pressures,
the tensions of divided loyalty are too much for any man, and as honorable and conscien-
tious as any individual might be, the public could never feel entirely easy about the vigor
and thoroughness with which the investigation was pursued. Some outside person is abso-
lutely essential." Id.
124 See id. at 5 ("[Tlhe appearance of a potential conflict of interest is bound to under-
mine the credibility of the investigation.").
125 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 17 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irving B. Nathan). A
change in the system is necessary to ensure the public that the Attorney General's decision
was not subject to political or personal pressures. Id.
126 See infra notes 129-141 and supporting text (discussing proposals and revisions en-
dorsed by Reauthorization Act of 1992).
127 See Dewar, supra note 17, at All. "[T]wenty-eight senate Republicans signed a letter
expressing their 'vehement opposition' to [the independent counsel law] and promis[ed] to
debate it 'at length' which is a senator's way to serve notice of a filibuster." Id.
128 Id. These Republican senators stated that they have "precious little time to complete
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But it was actually the difficulties arising from the Iran-Contra
investigation that prevented Congress from voting on the
Reauthorization Act. Thus, a careful look at these problems, along
with possible solutions, could spur reenactment of the independ-
ent counsel provisions in 1994.
B. The Reauthorization Act of 1992
In addition to reauthorizing the independent counsel provisions
for another five years, the Reauthorization Act of 1992 was
designed to strengthen fiscal and administrative controls, and re-
inforce the Attorney General's power to apply the Ethics Act to
members of Congress. 129 However, it appeared that Congress was
not satisfied with the provisions of the Reauthorization Act and
felt it better to let the law lapse. 130
The Reauthorization Act of 1992 would have added section
594(a)(1) to deal solely with fiscal control. 13 1 Many of the fiscal
control measures proposed in 1992 were previously suggested and
rejected in 1987.132 Under this new subsection, an independent
counsel would have to act with due regard for expense and make
only reasonable expenditures. 33 In addition, a staff person would
have been appointed to oversee expenditures.13 4 To alleviate costs,
this provision would have also mandated that the General Serv-
ices Administration house the independent counsels in buildings
owned or operated by the federal government. 135 In addition, sub-
appropriate bills and other must-pass measures before adjournment." Id.
129 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. The purpose of the Reauthorization Act is to
renew the act for five more years, strengthen fiscal and administrative controls on in-
dependent counsel proceedings, and clarify the authority of the Attorney General to apply
the independent counsel process to members of Congress. Id.
130 See Dewar, supra note 17, at All. In a letter to Senator Dole, Republican senators
who threatened to filibuster referred to the act as "pernicious." Id. These senators said that
a more timely consideration was necessary than could be given before Congress adjourned.
Id.
131 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 17 (imposing number of new fiscal and administra-
tive controls on independent counsel).
132 Id. at 19. It is feared that defendants could use these procedures to circumvent the
judicial system. Id. This report expressly stated that the provision would not give the crimi-
nal defendant the power to bar a subpoena, curtail a proceeding, or otherwise obstruct,
limit or delay an investigation or prosecution. Id.
133 Id. at 18. This provision defines "due regard for expense" as meaning that "an in-
dependent counsel must not conduct an investigation or prosecution on the premise that
'price is not object.'" Id. "Reasonable expenditures" are those which are necessary and
proper to the investigation and prosecution. Id.
134 Id. at 19.
135 See id. at 13. Independent counsels contacted by the subcommittee explained that
being located in a federal building would reduce rental costs and provide services, such as
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section (d) of section 594 would have reduced costs further by pro-
viding that staff members not be paid more than comparable posi-
tions in the Attorney General's office.
136
In response to the extensive duration of the Iran-Contra investi-
gation, the Reauthorization Act included time restraint provi-
sions. 137 Proposed subsection (b) of section 594 stated that in-
dependent counsels and their staff would not be entitled to travel
and subsistence expenses after one year. 138 In addition, proposed
subsection (g) of section 594 provided that the Special Division
could terminate an independent counsel if the independent coun-
sel's work had "been completed or so substantially completed that
it would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to
complete."' 39
The final amendment proposed in the Reauthorization Act of
1992 was section 591(c)(2), which broadened the Attorney Gen-
eral's authority to apply the Act to members of Congress. 140 This
amendment would remove the need for the Attorney General to
first find that an investigation or prosecution by the Department
of Justice "may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict
of interest."
14 1
C. Proposed Changes for 1994
Although numerous Republican senators and the Justice De-
partment no longer support the independent counsel provisions,
many others support its reenactment. 142 These provisions should
guard protection, which would usually be an additional expense in a commercial building.
Id.
136 Id. at 13-14.
137 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 19-20 (proposed subsection (b) and (g) of § 594).
138 Id. at 19.
139 Id. at 21.
140 Id. at 22.
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 591(c). This section concerns the investigation of persons not specifi-
cally listed in the Act. Id. Furthermore, it provides that there first be a determination that
a specific conflict of interest may exist. Id.; 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. This new
provision eliminates the need for such a determination. Id. The proposal would allow ap-
pointment if it would be in "the public interest." Id.
142 See Webb, supra note 18, at 18. Mr. Webb served as an independent counsel and as
an associate independent counsel. Id. He believes that the statute serves a necessary func-
tion in the governmental system. Id.; 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-7. Testimony in sup-
port of renewal was heard by representatives of the legal community and the public, includ-
ing the American Bar Association, Common Cause, Judge George E. McKinnon (presiding
judge of the special court), and Professor K.J. Harriger of Wake Forest University. Id. But
see id. at 7. The Department of Justice argued that the law was "premised on the assump-
tion that the professional prosecutors of the Department of Justice could not successfully
1993]
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be renewed in 1994, although some revisions are necessary.
First, the independent counsel provisions should not be ex-
tended to members of Congress. The purpose of these provisions
was to eliminate conflicts of interest that could arise when the
Department of Justice, a part of the executive branch, investi-
gated and prosecuted other members of the executive branch. 143
Congress is a separate branch of government, which has no power
over the investigations of the Justice Department.14 4 Therefore,
the possibility of any conflicts of interest are slight.'45 Further-
more, if any personal conflict of interest may arise from a particu-
lar investigation, the Attorney General may exercise its right to
request an independent counsel.' 46
Second, it is not appropriate to place strict time and budget con-
straints on independent counsels. Most governmental investiga-
tions, including those conducted by the Justice Department, take
more time and money than investigations conducted in the public
sector because more complex issues are usually involved. 147 In ad-
dition, each investigation differs and special circumstances may
cause one to be longer and more expensive than another. 148 How-
ever, in order to assure that taxpayer money is being spent pru-
dently, it is urged that the 1992 fiscal proposals be resubmitted in
investigate and prosecute high government officials." Id.
143 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. "The purpose of this system is to ensure fair and
impartial criminal proceedings when an Administration attempts the delicate task of in-
vestigating its own top officials." Id.
144 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988) (stating that Constitution prevents
Congress from having power to remove executive officials); see also Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926) (holding that Constitution forbids Congress right to remove executive
official).
145 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 7 (testimony of Katy J. Harringer). Professor Harriger
researched this legislation for ten years and found no evidence that showed there was rea-
son to extend the coverage of the independent counsel provisions to members of Congress.
Id.; Hearings, supra note 4, at 14 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irving B. Nathan). Simi-
larly, the American Bar Association found no reason why there would be a conflict of inter-
est between the Department of Justice and members of Congress. Id.
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 510. This section allows the Attorney General to delegate his author-
ity. Id. The Attorney General is permitted to "make such provisions as he considers appro-
priate authorizing the performance by any other officer, employee, or agency of the Depart-
ment of Justice of any function of the Attorney General." Id.
147 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 10 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irving B. Nathan).
Because of the nature of these investigations, they often can not be handled expeditiously
by either the independent counsel or the Justice Department. Id. Unlike the Justice De-
partment, which works from an agency budget, the independent counsel's expenses are
dealt with individually for each investigation which causes them to be critiqued more in-
tensely. Id. at 11.
14 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. The $1.5 million cost of the investigation by
Alexia Morrison stemmed from the constitutional challenges. Id.
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1994. These proposals cannot be deemed unreasonable since they
simply compel an independent counsel to be more cautious with
its spending and do not require that particular financial limita-
tions be followed.
149
Third, the three-year inquiry proposed in subsection (g) of
section 594150 should be eliminated. Subsection (g) makes it
mandatory for the Special Division to review the progress of inves-
tigations every three years and to determine if termination of any
investigation is necessary.' 5 ' This subsection is unnecessary since
the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act already pro-
vide that the Special Division may request the Attorney General
to terminate an independent counsel if his or her work is deemed
to be completed to the extent that the Department of Justice
would consider it to be completed. 152
Lastly, it is suggested that the independent counsel provisions
should provide judicial review of the Attorney General's decision
not to request an independent counsel.15 3 A court would merely
review whether the Attorney General complied with the standard
set forth in the statute, and that the information was credible and
specific.'5 4 This mechanism would abate public concern that the
Attorney General was biased in deciding not to request the ap-
pointment of an independent counsel. 155
CONCLUSION
Since its enactment in 1978, the independent counsel provisions
of the Ethics Act provided an important mechanism for assuring
149 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 12-14. The proposals include compliance with Jus-
tice Department policies on spending and filing of annual reports to Congress. Id.; Hear-
ings, supra note 4, at 7 (testimony of Katy J. Harriger). Although fiscal responsibility is
necessary, strict financial limitations are not. Id.
150 See 1992 REPORT, supra note 2, at 21. This provision would require the Special Divi-
sion to review each investigation after a three-year period to determine if it should con-
tinue. Id.
151 Id.
152 See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1993).
153 See Dellums v. Smith, 573 F. Supp. 1489 (N.D. Cal. 1983), rev'd, 797 F.2d 817 (9th
Cir. 1986). The District Court held that it had the authority to review the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision not to conduct a preliminary investigation. Id. (emphasis added).
154 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 17-18 (testimony of Samuel Dash & Irving B. Nathan).
The court will review the Attorney General's decision from the report it submitted and
appoint an independent counsel if it concludes that the standard was improperly utilized.
Id. The American Bar Association proposal clearly stated that the court would not be enti-
tled to decide if there should be a prosecution. Id.
155 See id. at 17. There is a need to assure the public that this decision was not based on
political or personal pressures, but on the standard set in the statute. Id.
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impartiality in the investigation and prosecution of government
officials. Government scandals tarnish the integrity of the polit-
ical structure, and this should not be compounded by a biased in-
vestigation. The independent counsel provisions were effective in
eliminating conflicts of interest in governmental prosecutions.
However, Congress's failure to reauthorize these provisions may
have a devastating effect on such prosecutions in the future.
Therefore, Congress should reinstate the independent counsel
provisions in 1994..
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